Evidence is given that the reforms of the 1980's in Chinese state-owned enterprises strengthened a nascent managerial labor market by incorporating many of the incentives present in Western managerial labor markets, although in other forms. Poorly performing firms were more likely to have a new manager selected by auction; to be required to have a higher security deposit posted by the manager; and to be subject to more frequent review of the manager's contract. Managers could be, and were, fired for poor firm performance. A manager's pay was linked to the firm's sales and profits and this link was significantly strengthen by the reforms. The substitution of incentives for central control of enterprises was intended, in part, to improve productivity --a result documented in other studies. We demonstrate that, in addition, the economic reforms helped develop an improved system of managerial resource allocation responsive to market forces.
Introduction
In this paper we give evidence that the reforms of the 1980's in Chinese stateowned enterprises significantly strengthened a nascent managerial labor market. We suggest that one important result of the economic reforms was the development of an improved system of managerial resource allocation that is responsive to market forces. A key point of the reforms was to substitute incentives for central control of enterprises in order to improve productivity. These reforms also had the effect of transforming to a significant extent the nature of management in these enterprises. To a surprising degree, the reforms resulted in managerial resources being assigned in accordance with economic forces. This is perhaps a controversial thesis. The conventional view seems to be that managerial resource assignments are still governed by bureaucratic and political considerations, and managers subject to rigid supervision and control. The director of an enterprise is viewed as a government bureaucrat, subject to the civil service rules and procedures governing his salary, rank, and promotion opportunities. It is, however, widely appreciated that the reforms of the 1980's were directed at improving the efficiency of enterprises by replacing direct control from above with managerial incentives. New incentive schemes such as the "profit responsibility system" were introduced which linked rewards to managers to improvements in firm performance. However, while necessary, it is not sufficient to provide incentives alone. Although some managers who were appointed prior to the reforms could be expected to welcome and respond to the new incentives, others might be expected to have trouble adapting, or worse, be resistant to change. A thoroughgoing reform must not just change the incentive environment but also must provide a mechanism for selecting managers who will be responsive to the new opportunities. Appropriate supervision and replacement of managers may be as important as the provision of incentives. In assessing the managerial reforms, we are examining consequences of decisions made by two different sets of agents. One set of decisions are those made by bureaucratic superiors of the firm which include (i) decisions to promote, demote, move, or otherwise change a current manager's status; (ii) the choice of selection method if a new manager is appointed; and (iii) the form of contract to offer the firm that governs the remuneration of managers. The other set of decisions are those made by managers in response to the incentives provided by the decision rules of their superiors. The decade of the 1980's in China was a period of remarkable innovation and experimentation in alternative methods of economic reform. Our evidence is not that all of the state-owned sector was converted at once, or even over the decade, from bureaucratic to market-driven managerial appointment methods. Rather, at different times during the decade, as reform efforts were made in different ways, we find that those emphasizing market solutions in the appointment of managers were more effective than those that were not. Further, there was a growing use of market-type solutions, suggesting that the lessons were being learned and appreciated by the reformers. Overall, the gains from the partial reform of China's state firms are demonstrable.
Output per worker rose 67% (in constant prices) between 1980 and 1989 for the enterprises in our sample, and total factor productivity rose 36% (Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton 1 Production function estimates from several other data sets also show increases in state firms' productivity. Gordon and Li (1989) , using a sample of 400 state enterprises, estimated that productivity rose by 4.6% annually over the period 1983 -1987 . Dollar (1990 estimated, using a sample of 20 state enterprises, that productivity rose by 4.7% annually over the period 1978 -1982 . Chen et. al. (1988 estimated, using aggregate data, that productivity rose between 1.9% and 2-7% annually over the period [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] . See also: Hay and Liu (1991) , Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992); and Perkins (1988) . Not all of this improvement in productivity is attributable to the particular reforms that we investigate here. Firms also faced increased product-market discipline because of greater competition from other state firms and from new, nonstate firms, and this was an important source of productivity gains . Gains also came from granting firms autonomy in their output decisions and increasing the share of profits firms were allowed to retain (Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton, 1992) . Managerial reforms would probably not have been effective had they not been made in conjunction with increased autonomy and increased product market competition. Section II describes the selection of managers and the changes in the overall environment within which managers operate. Section III summarizes and interprets the main empirical results. Section IV provides details of the data set, model specification and estimation, and specific results. Section V summarizes the findings and presents further speculations on the process of change in China.
II. Selection of Managers
Both before and after the reforms, the managers of Chinese state-owned firms were selected by the industrial bureau charged with regulating the firm. There is a classic principal-agent relationship between the industrial bureau and the manager. The agent--the prospective or current manager--has some relevant information that is not known by the principal--the industrial bureau. This information may concern the manager's own abilities and/or the firm's potential productivity. Either kind of information can generate adverse selection. In addition, the manager may take actions that affect the firm's productivity and that cannot be directly observed by the industrial bureau; moral hazard is present. The bureau cannot know whether poor performance by the firm is attributable to (a) inherently low productivity of the firm; (b) managerial incompetence; (c) managerial decisions that pursue goals other than productivity; or (d) bad luck.
(Thus a model of the firm similar to that of Laffont and Tirole (1986) applies here.) We, as outside analysts, can be expected to be at least as ill-informed as the industrial bureau, with one exception, namely, the benefit of hindsight: a firm's ex post performance tells us something about its ex ante potential. In the pre-reform command economy, enterprises are best thought of as branch plants of a single giant firm. Enterprise managers were hired and fired by officials in the industrial bureaus, which were in turn organized into sectoral and geographical divisions. The entire industrial system was accountable to a national or regional Planning Commission, which steered the entire system through a complex system of highly specific commands which extended all the way down the hierarchy to managers at the plant level. Authority relations were complicated by the intrusive role of the Communist Party, which functioned more or less as the Personnel department of this enormous corporation, maintaining dossiers and tracking managerial careers. Managers were rewarded for following orders and subservience to political dogma. The inefficiency of which this system was capable is well known. During the 1980s, China sought to improve industrial efficiency through a multi-stranded program of experimental reforms. First, reformers sought to enhance the authority of enterprise managers. This involved reducing the power of Communist Party officials to intervene in enterprise decision-making, and giving managers legal responsibility for enterprise decisions. "Factory manager responsibility systems" were implemented in the majority of enterprises in our sample by the mid-1980s, and were predominant by 1988. Enhanced managerial authority also implied a reduction in the number of specific instructions given to managers by bureaucratic superiors. Second, enterprises were provided with significant incentive funds. Profit retention schemes allowed enterprises to draw funds for worker bonuses, worker welfare facilities, and enterprise investment in accordance with improvements in profitability. These schemes clearly gave the enterprise as a whole an interest in increasing productivity. They also implied a substantial increase in the economic resources over which managers had direct control. Thus, the authority and control of resources by factory managers increased substantially, and the nature of the principal-agent relation between the industrial bureaus and factory managers began to change. A third strand of reform--the primary focus of the present paper--was to develop new mechanisms to reward managers and link managerial careers more effectively to firm performance. In most cases, the hierarchical structure of authority was maintained intact. Over 80% of the managers in our sample were appointed by industrial bureaus in the traditional way. For most managers, careers continued to be determined by the evaluations of bureaucratic superiors, and it is therefore important to examine the process by which the bureaus select and supervise managers. We argue below that there were significant changes both in the incentive environment facing the industrial bureaus, and in the procedures they used to select managers. In some cases, reforms broke out of the traditional mold of appointment by bureaucratic superiors. The most significant was the system of selection by competitive auctions. About 14% of the managers in our sample were selected by competitive 2 An alternative experimental reform involved the selection of managers by Workers' Congresses in the enterprise, in a manner somewhat like the Yugoslav system of worker management. About 4% of the managers in our sample were selected by Workers' Congresses. The sample is too small for statistical analysis, and we have not examined this subgroup further. These reforms were experimental, and gained momentum in the late 1980s.
Two years alone, 1987 and 1988, accounted for over half (57.4%) of the competitive auctions in the decade, although for only 23% of all managerial changes. The use of competitive auctions for selecting managers is quite revealing of the extent to which market ideas have penetrated the Chinese state-owned enterprise system. After all, an auction is an extreme market method for allocating resources. Auctions, in general, are fundamentally devices for revealing information;
an auction is used when there is large uncertainty about the value of the item being exchanged--a Picasso, an oil tract, or a shipment of eggplants (McAfee and McMillan, 1987 ). China's managerial auctions serve to reveal information about both the potential managers' capabilities and the firms' inherent productivity, especially in the case in which the incumbent manager is bidding. In a fully functioning managerial labor market, information about potential managers comes from long-term observation of their performance in lower management jobs. In the transition economy, starting with the left-overs of the planned economy, information on past performance is unreliable or nonexistant. Auctions are an alternative source of information.
Auction procedures varied among regions in China, but certain common procedures can be described [c.f Naughton (forthcoming:1993) ]. Enterprises were generally put up for auction by municipal governments (which control most enterprises in China). In some cases, the industrial bureau acted jointly with the municipal budgetary authorities to carry out the auction. In other cases, an "evaluation commission" was established with outside experts participating as well.
Before the auction, the firm's accounts were made available for inspection by any potential bidder. The most important component of the bid was a promise to turn over a specified amount of enterprise profit to municipal authorities over the following three to five years. Thus, the auction process resembled a competitive leasing procedure. Minimum bids were often established by auction commissions. However, firms were not simply auctioned to the highest bidder. Bidders submitted management plans describing investment and product development.
In most cases, bidders made commitments to invest a certain minimum of enterprise retained profits in output expansion, and sometimes made commitments to reach a specified output level as well. Bidders were assessed for reliability and professional skill, sometimes through an explicit point system. The auctioners then chose the winning bidder on the basis of promised profit delivery, the soundness of the management plan, and the characteristics of the individual bidder. Regardless of whether firms were subjected to competitive auction or not, the top manager was generally required to sign a management contract. In many cases, the manager was required to put up a security deposit, which could be forfeited if the firm failed to perform as promised. This security deposit was substantial: the mean level in our sample was 8,500 yuan, compared to a mean annual managerial salary of 17,000 yuan in 1989. There is anecdotal evidence that some managers did indeed lose some or all of their security deposit following poor firm performance: it was genuinely at risk. Like the auctions themselves, the security deposits can be interpreted as substituting for other managerial incentives found in established managerial labor markets. In the West, managers often have a stake in the firm in the form of stock holdings or stock options: security deposits similarly serve to give the manager a stake in the firm's performance. III. Summary and Interpretation of Empirical Results In a well functioning market, one expects to see a relatively large number of transactions. Thus, a first question to ask about the Chinese managerial labor market is whether there is evidence of much turnover. In our sample, a sizable number (44%) of the managers serving at the end of the period (1990) had been appointed since 1985. Only 11% had been appointed before 1980. Since fewer than a quarter (23.2%) of the current managers replaced retiring managers, turnover is occurring for other reasons. A clue can be gleaned from the observation that of the remaining group, 37.9% replaced managers who were promoted, 45.6% replaced ones who were moved laterally, and 16.4%
replaced ones who were demoted. We can compare this turnover in a rough way with average tenure lengths for American and Japanese chief executives. Kato and Rockell (1992, p. 34) report that incumbent chief executives have held their positions in the U.S. and Japan for an average of 7.1 and 7.7 years respectively. This compares to the average tenure of currently serving Chinese managers in our sample of 5.5 years. Thus, Chinese managerial turnover in the 1980's appears to be slightly more frequent than that of managers in the U.S. and Japan. Since one of the key features of an active, mature market is a high number of transactions, this evidence on turnover of managers is supportive of the idea that there is developing in China a labor market for managerial resources. Active managerial turnover contrasts sharply with limited turnover of production workers in China. Most ordinary workers enjoy lifetime employment and almost never change jobs. For example, in our sample, in 1984 only 3.70% of workers quit, were fired or transferred (1.30% retired) and in 1989 only 2.76% quit, were fired or transferred (1.33% retired). (An average tenure for managers of 5.5 years corresponds roughly to an 18% yearly turnover.) It is worth stressing, then, that while ordinary Chinese workers rarely change jobs, Chinese managers in the 1980's frequently did. This activity contrasts sharply with the conventional view of a relatively rigid management structure. We examine two main methods for selecting a new manager--appointment by superior and competitive auctions. It should be noted at the outset that the choice between these two methods is made by the industrial bureau. Thus, the basic principal-agent relation is unchanged by the choice of managerial selection, which should therefore be seen as a choice made by the principal (the industrial bureau) in order to elicit the desired behavior from a class of potential agents. The next question to ask is therefore whether we can explain the choice of appointment methods made by the industrial bureaus.
Auctions, as noted, serve to reveal information. Imagine that the industrial bureau, seeing that a firm is performing poorly, does not know whether the poor performance is due to bad management or to features of the firm beyond the manager's control. Then it might decide to use an auction, for the bidding process will reveal the identities of alternative potential managers, and the bids will reveal their various estimates of the firm's potential. Thus we might expect that the industrial bureau will tend to opt for auctions of firms that are performingly poorly, and appointment for firms that are performing well. We investigate the effect on managerial choice of poor performance (measured by the firm's output per worker relative to the industry) that is observable ex ante. (The details of the econometric analysis is given in the next section.) We find that low performance of the firm prior to a change in manager is significant in explaining the use of an auction to select a new manager. Poorly performing firms were not only disproportionately subject to auctions, they were also associated with a larger security deposit being required and also with a shorter management contract. Thus, the industrial bureaus were more willing to allow poorly performing firms to be auctioned off, but also subjected them to more frequent review and larger security deposits. Conversely, good performers were given more autonomy, in the sense of having longer-term managerial contracts and smaller security deposits. However, it is interesting to note that poorly performing firms by this definition did not have a disproportionate number of their managers demoted--poor performance was not a significant explanatory variable in explaining demotions. In addition to examining the firms' ex ante performance relative to industrial averages and relating this performance to various managerial selection variables, we compared each firm's performance before and after the change of manager. Significant improvement of firm performance after a managerial change can provide information about the former manager's performance that is not apparent by looking directly at the performance of the firm under the former manager. Poor performance of a firm, relative to the industry, for example, may be the result of bad luck or poor market conditions, a poor physical plant, low quality labor and other inputs, or poor management. However, an improvement in performance reveals the existence of unfulfilled potential of the firm prior to the managerial change. Thus, ex post improvement is evidence of ex ante poor managerial performance. While ex ante poor performance may not be observable by outside observers (such as ourselves) viewing only simple indicators of performance, it is plausibly observable by industrial bureaus, which have significant local knowledge of their firms (though presumably less than the firm managers themselves).
Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that an improvement in performance accompanying a change of manager is the result of the bureau observing that the firm is performing poorly, relative to its potential (as perceived by the bureau), and then appointing a more competent or energetic manager. Thus, although ex ante poor performance is not associated with demotion, if the hypothesis is true that managers were demoted because their performance was poor relative to their firm's potential, then we would expect to see performance improve after the change of managers for these firms. This hypothesis is not contradicted by our data. Our results show that a significant increase in performance relative to the industry average performance (as measured by output per worker) occurred under a new manager if the previous manager was demoted. In fact, relative performance increased under a new manager in all cases, but the magnitude of improvement was three times greater and highly significant if the previous manager had been demoted. Furthermore, the increase in performance was not significant if, in contrast, the previous manager had been promoted. Thus, demotion and promotion of managers appears to be closely related to firm performance relative to potential under that manager. In contrast with the group of managers who were demoted, the group of auctioned firms as a whole did not show such a dramatic improvement in performance. However, closer analysis reveals a difference in postauction performance between firms in which the incumbent manager won the auction (55% of the auctioned firms) versus those for which a new manager won. Firms in which the new manager won experienced no significant improvement in performance, but those in which the incumbent won did. This result suggests a type of adverse selection mechanism at work. Given a group of auctioned firms that look roughly the same to an outsider, these firms will attract roughly equivalent bids from outsiders. However, incumbents, presumably with superior information, will know which of these firms has better than average potential for improvement. Less promising firms will be disproportionately captured by outsiders. This mechanism does not depend in any way on outsiders behaving irrationally or naively. They can take their disadvantageous informational position into account and still will be over-represented as winners among the poorer firms. In the large majority of firms whose managers were selected by superiors, managers were also required to sign management contracts (including specification of profit remittances). An improvement in performance was observed for those firms whose new contract coincided with a new manager, whereas no such improvement was detected for managers when a new contract was administered by an incumbent manager. This should be expected since, as noted above, a disproportionate number of firms whose previous manager was demoted are in the group of firms with new managers. On the other hand, firms whose new contract is administered by incumbent managers would include firms whose performance was sufficiently good neither to call for a demotion of the current manager, nor for putting the firm up for 3 Another possible explanation of the ex post improvement of firms whose managers were selected by auction is that auctioning is a better mechanism for selecting managers who are responsive to the new incentives than is appointment by superiors. This explanation cannot, however, tell us why firms whose previous managers were demoted were more likely to have their successor selected by auction; nor why those whose managers retired are more likely to have their new manager selected by superiors. These phenomena must reflect the incentives facing the industrial bureaus, that is, the principals in our principal-agent analysis. We have argued that managers are demoted (promoted) following poor (good) performance relative to firm potential. Thus, the threat of demotion and the chance of promotion do appear to work as incentives for the manager. Other, more direct incentives come from linking a manager's pay to the firm's performance. To check for the existence of such incentives, we investigate the relationship of the managers's pay to the firm's profits and sales. We find that both sales and profits are significant explanatory variables determining managerial wages and that the relationship between sales and wages is convex. Furthermore, we find that these relationships are strengthened after the firms sign the new managerial responsibility contract with the government, thus suggesting that the reforms increased the individual incentives managers had to improve firm performance --at least as measured by profits and sales. Since we are using a panel-data model with fixed firm effects, these results are not merely a reflection of the fact that bigger firms pay more. Rather, they imply that when a particular firm increases either its sales and/or profits, the manager's pay increases. These results between pay and performance are similar to what has been estimated for Western and Japanese firms (except that stockmarket value is usually used as an explanatory variable instead of profits). In the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, top-manager pay has been found to be either weakly or insignificantly related to stockmarket value, and very significantly related to sales (Kato and Rockell, 1992; Murphy, 1985; Rosen, 1990) . Why should pay be dependent on sales (in addition to profits)? One answer might be that it is for reasons similar to those in the West. Perhaps, in a fast-growing firm, it is hard for the principal (stockholders in the West, the industrial bureau in China) to monitor where all the money is going; managers can direct some of it into their pockets. Alternatively, a Chinese industrial bureau might deliberately want to base pay on sales. If the firm has some monopoly power, it is not in the social interest that it maximize profits; rather, it should produce more than the profitmaximizing output. Domar (1974) modeled socially optimal managerial compensation for a state-owned firm with monopoly power, with the manager's pay being based on a weighted average of sales and profits. Domar's illustrative arithmetic suggests that, even when demand is quite elastic, significant weight should go on sales: this is consistent with our empirical findings. The survey instrument was divided into two parts. The first part was directed to the factory manager personally, and included seventy questions on personal history, personal views on management of the firm, and details of the management system. The second part was directed to the firm accountant. Over 300 detailed quantitative questions were asked of each firm for each year from 1980 to 1989. 9% of the sample firms were managed directly by the central government; provincial governments controlled 10%; municipal governments controlled 72% of the firms; and county governments the remaining 9%. The sample is broadly representative of the large-scale state-owned urban manufacturing sector in China. Relatively few small-scale state firms are included (these are disproportionately rural), and almost no extractive industry.
IV. Model Specification and Estimation
Firms were surveyed in four provinces that together contribute about 20% of China's industrial output. One province (Jiangsu) is more industrialized than China as a whole, and grew more rapidly over the 1980s; the other three (Jilin, Shanxi and Sichuan) are slightly less industrialized than China as a whole and grew slightly less rapidly over the 1980s. By most measures, the surveyed firms are close to Chinese averages. Total profit and tax per unit of capital in our sample was 22.6% in 1980, compared to 24.9% for all state industry nationwide. In 1989, a year of recession, profit and tax per unit capital in the sample was 17.3%, compared to 17.2% for all state industry nationwide. The sample seems to be quite typical of the Chinese state industrial 4 Other studies that have used this data set include: Groves, Hong, McMillan, & Naughton (1992) , Li (1991), and 
. B. Model Specification for Manager Selection Effects
The basic model used to analyze our data was a panel model with fixed effects; it is specified generically by: Z it = α t + β i + γ´X it where Z is the dependent variable and X are various independent variables. The two fixed effects, year and firm, are included in some of our specifications to eliminate spurious 5 By including dummies for every year and the firm, it is more difficult to get significant parameters for other explantory variables. For some models, one or another of the two fixed effects parameters, α t and β i was set equal to zero. A major variable that we used as both an independent and dependent variable (in different models) was firm performance. The basic performance measure for firm i in year t, Y it , was calculated relative to an industry average. Thus, if Q it was the output of firm i in year t, w it the number of workers employed in firm i in year t, and S a specific industry (sector), we defined Since two of the dependent variables were discrete --whether or not the manager's job was auctioned and whether or not the previous manager was demoted --we used a probit analysis model for these variables. Thus, we estimated the likelihood that the manager's job was auctioned and the likelihood that the previous manager had been demoted. The dependent and independent variables were defined as: 
: average relative performance of firm i over 3 years to year prior to t, the first year of the manager's contract
L it
: relative size of firm, compared to industry, as measured by labor work force. Ordinary regression equations were estimated for the first two (continuous) dependent variables.
A generic cross-section model for these variables was specified by:
As noted above, however, since the auction and demotion variables are binary probit models were estimated for these two dependent variables.
Specifically, for the two discrete variables, if Z i = 1 denotes that the manager's job was auctioned or that the previous manager was demoted and Z i = 0 denotes non-auction or no demotion, respectively, the probit model was defined by:
where G is the standard unit normal cumulative distribution function and β is the parameter vector. Because we assume that all the information in X i about Z i can be summarized by the single scalar index X i´β , a positive sign on a component of β will indicate a positive correlation between the component of X i and the likelihood of either the manager's job being auctioned or the previous manager having been demoted, depending on which dependent variable is under consideration. We estimate the vector β by the method of maximum likelihood for the conditional Bernoulli distribution P[Z i = 1 | X i ]. We explored the robustness of the MLE f the assumption that G is standard normal by alternatively specifying G to be the logit function. The results were similar and all significance levels for the various coefficients remained unchanged. We report only the results for the normal model.
The results for all four dependent variables were: The 'n.s.' denotes that the coefficient was not significant and hence dropped from the equation.
Interpretation:
Thus, the lower was the performance of the firm in the period before the change of manager, 1) the higher would be the required security deposit, 2) the more likely the new manager would be selected by auction, and 3) the shorter the managerial contract would be. Evidently, however, lower performance prior to the change in manager was not significantly related to demotion of the previous manager.
As we show next, firms whose manager was demoted did significantly better than other firms under new managers. This suggests that it may not be ex ante low observable performance that leads to dismissal, but low performance relative to the firm's potential, about which it might be reasonable to assume that the industrial bureaus have some information.
Results 2: Tests of Performance Shift after Demotion of Manager
The general panel model with fixed effects was used to test for a shift in performance of the firm after the manager was demoted: Interpretation: (i) Although the shift in output/worker (performance) was significantly higher in all firms after a change in manager, the effect was more than twice as strong in those firms whose prior manager was demoted (as opposed to being promoted, retire, moved laterally, etc.)
(ii) In contrast with the sub-sample of firms whose prior manager was demoted, there was no significant improvement in output per worker of firms whose prior manager was promoted. This lends support to the idea that promotion and demotion decisions were influenced, at least in part, by the performance of the firm. W it = firm i's manager's wages in year t (in logs) X it = various measures of firm performance including profits and sales (in logs), and the squares of log profits and log sales. Interpretation: The first regression shows that profits are highly significant in explaining wages.
X it
The second regression shows that the relation between wages and sales is convex and also significant. Note again that since the model is specified with a firm specific effect this is not a result that states wages are larger for larger firms. The third regression shows that both sales and profits are significant in explaining wages, with the sales relation being convex and significant and the profit relation concave, but just insignificant. We next examined how these relationships might have changed subsequent to the reform. That is, we considered if the dependency of wages on profits and sales became greater after a firm was given one of the new managerial responsiblity contracts. Again, the survey of enterprises gives some reported indirect evidence on this question. Nearly three quarters of the managers reported that their income increased since enterprise contracting was implemented and on average their income was 37.4% higher than it would have been without the reform contract. We tested this by checking for a regime shift or testing the significance of a composite variable defined by profits (or sales) times a dummy variable that is zero (0) prior to the new firm contract and unity (1) during the post-contract period. Interpretation: The first regression shows that the relationship between managerial wages and profits was very much stronger after the new contracts were signed with the firms. The second and third regressions, which show both profit and sales to be significant explanatory variables for managerial wages, also show a highly significant post-contract increase in the relationship between either sales or profits and managerial 7 In a separate regression of managerial wages on sales, profits, squared sales, squared profits, and BOTH delta sales AND delta profits, the coefficients on both delta terms were insignificant. This we attribute to the high degree of correlation between sales and profits and is analogous to the results showing that only sales are significant in a simple linear regression of managerial wages on sales and profits.
V. Conclusion
We have given evidence that, by the end of the 1980s, China had developed a managerial labor market that incorporated many of the incentives present in Western managerial labor markets, albeit in different forms. Managers could be, and were, fired for poor firm performance; here the industrial bureau did the job of a Western firm's board of directors. A manager's pay was linked to the firm's sales and profits and this link was significantly strengthen by the reforms (i.e. post-contract). Managers were, in many cases, selected by auction; arguably the auction process was a device for revealing information about potential managers that, in a market economy, would come from long-term observation of the potential managers'
performance. Managers were often required to post a security deposit, to be forfeited if the firm performed abnormally poorly, effectively giving them a stake in their firm's performance analogous to a Western manager's stock options. These results are particularly important since it is increasingly recognized that, in any of the formerly planned economies of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Asia, managers in state-owned firms must be monitored during the transition to a market economy. Because privatization is a difficult, long-term process, it appears inescapable that state bureaucrats must provide some monitoring of firms for an intermediate period. The alternative of immediate abolition of bureaucratic oversight leaves the situation ripe for plundering of public assets by existing managers in the period before privatization can be carried out. The Chinese evidence suggests it is possible for bureaucratic superiors to provide reasonably effective monitoring during this transition. Why were bureaucrats in China willing to change their oversight of enterprise managers to encourage market-conforming behavior? We cannot directly answer this question, since our sample has not provided us with any opportunity to directly observe the incentives or behavior of industrial bureaus (except their activity in selecting enterprise managers). However, because the question is important, it may be worth entertaining some speculations. Three factors may be important. The first was the removal--or at least significant downgrading--of the Communist Party and "political correctness" criteria from the sphere of managerial evaluation. Second was the growth of product market competition.
Bureaucrats had strong incentives to reward effective managers since they were increasingly unable to shield ineffective managers from the impact of competition. The competitive survival and profitability of their industrial systems thus depended on employing effective managers.
Third is the degree of decentralization in the Chinese industrial system. After reforms, rather than being managed as a single national corporation as in the unreformed Soviet model, Chinese firms have been predominantly managed at the regional and municipal level. These smaller industrial systems are more likely to have "hard" budget constraints than a nationally integrated system (which is close to a credit creation mechanism). Regional corporations may be above optimal size, but they are still subject to some of the evolutionary pressures created by market competition. Our results should not be interpreted to mean that a bureaucratic economy can simulate the benefits of a market economy simply by introducing more rational managerial selection and reward procedures. Rather, we argue that in the context of a broad program of marketization, such as China undertook in the 1980s, improved managerial selection can occur under the aegis of the bureaucratic system. As such, the development of nascent managerial labor markets can play an important subsidiary role in the overall transition to a market economy.
There is evidence that this has been happening in China.
